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postreform China, finding that this relationship is nonlinear and is negative irrespective 
of time horizons. 
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1 Introduction 
The literature on the relationship between inequality and growth is large and still 
growing. Yet, theoretical and empirical evidences are mixed (Banerjee and Duflo, 2003, 
and references therein). Typically, cross-section regressions yield a negative 
relationship (Benabou, 1996b), while the contrary is found using panel data models with 
fixed effect (Forbes, 2000; Li and Zou, 1998). In addition, Barro (2000) indicates that 
the relationship is nonsignificant when rich and poor countries are pooled together. 
As asserted by Forbes (2000), the changes of sign in the inequality–growth relationship 
can be explained by the difference in the time horizon considered. She concludes that in 
the long run the relationship is negative while it is positive in the short or medium run. 
This assertion is supported by Banerjee and Duflo (2003). However, neither of these 
studies considers short-, medium-, and long-run relationships in one unified framework. 
In fact, no previous attempts have been made to incorporate very short run effects into 
growth regressions.1 
Can this assertion or conclusion be used to reconcile the mixed empirical results? 
Answering this question is not only helpful in settling the intensive debate among 
academics, but also vital for policy makers. If the assertion is valid, possibilities exist 
for intertemporal tradeoffs of growth by manipulating income distributions. Otherwise, 
a low (high) inequality must be targeted in order to achieve growth if the short-, 
medium-, or long-run relationship is negative (positive). 
The conventional approach to discovering the long-run versus short-run relationship is 
by averaging growth and relevant variables over different time horizons, and then 
estimating a growth regression model. For example, Forbes (2000) uses data averaged 
over a 5-year interval in a growth regression and claims that this is a medium- or short-
run relationship, which is found to be positive. Subsequently, she also reports results 
using 10-year averages, which indicate an insignificant relationship. On the basis of 
these, Forbes asserts that the short-run positive relationship may not contradict the long-
run negative relationship. She seems to imply that if a longer time horizon, say 20 years, 
is considered for averaging data, the relationship may become negative. Meanwhile, 
Barro (2000) relies on averages over a 10-year interval to estimate long-run 
relationships. 
This practice of averaging is questionable on a number of grounds. First, no consensus 
exists regarding what time horizon constitutes or defines the short-, medium-, or long-
run concepts. For example, a 5-year interval can be considered as short run by some and 
medium run by others. Further, if conflicting results are obtained with a 20-year and a 
25-year averaging, can one attribute these to medium- and long-run differences? What 
happens if a 5-year and a 6-year averaging give rise to different results? It is important 
to note that if the true relationship does involve a change in sign at all, there must be a 
point where such a change occurs (say from period t to period t+1). In this case, one can 
state that the relationship is positive (or negative) over time horizon t periods and 
becomes negative (or positive) over time horizon t+1 periods. An appropriate analytical 
                                                 
1   By “very short run,” we mean instant impacts without any delay or with delay by one time period.   2
framework should enable identification of this turning point or possibly multiple turning 
points. In this regard, the conventional averaging procedure is problematic, if not 
inapplicable at all. 
Second, averaging data is usually justified on the ground that it takes away business 
cycle effects on growth.2 However, business cycles differ in length for the same 
economy over time and for different economies. They start and end at different time 
points for different economies as well. Simply applying one time interval in averaging 
data, for one country over time or for different countries, may not help eliminate the 
cycle effects. In other words, taking averages is useful only when business cycles are 
properly identified. In this case, the cycles must be completely synchronized among 
different economies under consideration and they must be of precisely the same length 
over time. These are unlikely to be true even if difficulties in business cycle 
identification can be left aside. 
Third, short-, medium-, and long-run relationships between inequality and growth are 
different aspects of the same underlying economic or growth process, which 
corresponds to a particular data-generating process (DGP). A DGP is exactly what an 
econometric model intends to capture or describe. When estimating different 
regressions, forced by arbitrarily chosen different time intervals for averaging data, one 
might model different DGPs rather than different aspects of the same DGP. From this 
perspective, the changes in sign may not reflect the difference between the long and 
short runs. It may be caused by the use of different averages and by other differences 
inherent in different regression models. 
Fourth, as pointed out by Attanasio et al. (2000), annual data provide information that is 
lost when averaging. This averaging practice is particularly puzzling as paucity of data 
is often cited as a major hurdle in estimating growth regressions (Durlauf, 2001). It can 
be easily ascertained that with a 5-year or a 10-year averaging, 80 or 90 percent of 
sample observations are lost. Finally, it is illogical to make short, medium, and long 
runs mutually exclusive as far as model specification is concerned. After all, these 
different runs correspond to different aspects of the same DGP and thus should be 
embedded in a common DGP or a common regression equation. In any case, it is 
desirable to develop a framework that allows for identification of the growth–inequality 
relationship over all possible time horizons. One can then discuss findings with a 
precise definition of time intervals. Under this circumstance, results from different 
studies can be compared even if data used are of different frequencies. For example, one 
does not have to stick to 5-year averages in order to compare her/his results with Forbes 
(2000). 
The main purpose of this paper is to introduce such a modeling framework that enables 
identification of the short-, medium-, and long-run effects in one model. A second 
                                                 
2   Another argument against using annual data is that they are subject to shocks and may cloud the 
underlying true relationship. This argument seems untenable given the inclusion of the disturbance 
term in any econometric equations, which could accommodate shocks and other errors. In passing, it 
is noted that Barro (2000) opts to use averaged data but for different reasons, namely unavailability of 
high-frequency data for some variables and the inability of the existing theories in establishing very 
short run associations between growth and its determinants. Nevertheless, the inability should not 
prevent one from modeling empirical short-run relationships. After all, the medium- or long-run 
relationships are built on the short-run counterpart. The former do not exist without the latter.   3
purpose is to extend the work of Barro (2000) and Lundberg and Squire (2003) by 
adding important equations and by combining the simultaneous model with the newly 
introduced framework. In particular, education is endogenized in this paper. Although 
this can be justified intuitively, theoretically, and empirically, few previous papers made 
such an attempt with the exception of Heerink (1994). Finally, we use annual data from 
within China to explore the inequality–growth nexus over different time horizons. 
2  Theories on the inequality–growth nexus and the modeling framework3 
Several mechanisms are theorized to yield negative effects of inequality on growth. 
First, under imperfect capital market, a higher inequality means more individuals facing 
credit constraints. Consequently, they cannot carry out productive investments in 
physical or human capital (Galor and Zeira, 1993; Fishman and Simhon, 2002). These 
can take place in the short run or long run. Second, a worsening inequality generates a 
rise in the fertility rate among, and less investment in human capital of, the poor (De La 
Croix and Doepke, 2004). This is most likely to happen in the long run. Third, a more 
unequal income distribution may cause weaker domestic demand that may slow down 
the economy, as has occurred in China since the late 1990s. This demand-related impact 
is expected to prevail mostly in the short run. Fourth, a growing inequality increases 
redistributive tax pressures, which deters investment incentives (Alesina and Rodrik, 
1994; Persson and Tabellini, 1994; Benabou, 1996b). Finally, a worsening inequality 
may lead to a more unstable sociopolitical environment for economic activities 
(Benhabib and Rustichini, 1996). The last two mechanisms require certain time duration 
for the effects to materialize. 
On the other hand, Galor and Tsiddon (1997a, 1997b) develop two theories, both 
predicting a positive inequality–growth relationship. In one model, the level of human 
capital is determined by home environment externality. When this externality is large, a 
high level of inequality may be necessary for growth to take off in a less-developed 
country. In a second model, major technical changes help enhance mobility and 
concentration of high-ability workers in technologically advanced sectors, which will 
generate growth as well as higher inequality. Also, Benabou (1996a) shows that when 
human capitals of heterogeneous individuals are strongly complementary within 
localities, more inequality is inductive to growth, at least in the short run. In addition, a 
high or rising inequality prompts the middle class to vote for changes in taxation rate. 
Both higher (Saint-Paul and Verdier, 1993) and lower taxation rates (Li and Zou, 1998) 
could promote economic growth. Finally, conventional wisdom states that high 
inequality implies more savings or more investment (Galor and Moav, 2002). All these 
positive effects can materialize in the short or long run.  
Clearly, these theories indicate that the overall impact of inequality on growth cannot be 
set a priori (Aghion et al., 1999). More pertinent to this paper, the short- and long-run 
effects may well differ in magnitudes as well as in signs. As noted above, the very short 
                                                 
3   For a survey of literature on inequality and human development, see Thorbecke and Charumilind 
(2002). While human development, growth, and inequality are all interrelated, we focus on inequality 
and growth in this paper. The absence of regional time-series data on health and environment in China 
prevents us from considering these variables in our empirical model.   4
run effect is so far overlooked, despite its existence and importance. Even medium- and 
long-run effects are not modeled appropriately in the empirical literature. It is important 
to point out that the existing theories implicitly or explicitly assume that inequality 
affects growth through its impacts on physical and human capital formation. This point 
will be taken up later in this paper when our empirical model is specified. 
To enable identification of the inequality effects over different time horizons, 
distributed lag models can be used. Among the alternative distributed lag structures, the 
polynomial inverse lag (PIL) of Mitchell and Speaker (1986) is preferred as it possesses 
two attractive features: its flexibility in uncovering the true lag structure and its easiness 
in estimation. The second feature is especially important as we will combine PIL with 
simultaneous equations.  
Let Y denote growth and X denote inequality; then the PIL model can be written as 
0
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The underlined term on the right-hand side of (3) becomes negligible for t greater than 
8, thus can be omitted, as suggested by Mitchell and Speaker (1986). On the basis of 
(3), one can obtain the effects of X on Y over any time interval, such as 5 or 8 years.  
The instant impact is given by  0 2
n
j j wa
= =∑ , the lagged impacts are given by   
wi (i = 1, 2, …, ∞), and the cumulative impacts are given by ∑i wi, depending on how 
the short and long runs are defined. In particular, we can use the infinite sum to indicate 
the very long run impact.  
An expended version of (3) with the underlined term omitted is 
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The expressions in the square brackets are PIL terms associated with different degrees 
of polynomial n. 
One can set m = 9, add variables other than Xs in (4), and use the resultant regression to 
analyze the inequality–growth relationship. However, the issues of heterogeneity, 
measurement errors, and endogeneity have received considerable attention in the 
literature. These must be addressed (Durlauf et al., 2004; Atkinson and Brandolini, 
2001) before empirical estimation. In particular, Banerjee and Duflo (2003) argue why 
cross-country data are deficient due to differences in cultural structure, technology 
level, and financial institutions. While not claiming the absence of heterogeneity, this 
problem is less severe in this paper because data from within China will be used. More 
importantly, China remains a socialist country with strong institutional, cultural, 
political, and even economic controls across regions. Despite so, some dummy variables 
will be incorporated into our empirical model to further address the heterogeneity issue. 
Regarding measurement errors, this is largely related to the inequality variable, not or 
less applicable to other variables (Barro, 2000). To be more precise, inequality data used 
in most cross-country regressions are calculated under different concepts of income 
(GDP, wage, disposable income, or expenditure), different income recipients 
(individual, household, or family), and different sampling procedures (proportional 
sampling, stratified sampling) or even different coverage of population (national, 
subnational, regional, or small-scale survey). In this paper, the regional urban–rural 
income ratio will be used to measure inequality. Both rural and urban income data are 
based on household surveys conducted by the National Statistical Bureau (NSB) of 
China. Therefore, we do not consider measurement errors as a major problem, at least 
insofar as variable definitions, population coverage, and sampling techniques are 
concerned. Using the urban–rural income ratio as an inequality indicator is justified on 
the ground that the urban–rural income gap constitutes over 70 percent of the overall 
regional inequality (Kanbur and Zhang, 2005). And, no regional inequality data are 
available to us. Wei and Wu (2001) adopt the same practice. Bourguignon and Morrison 
(1998) find that the urban–rural labor productivity ratio is highly correlated with overall 
inequality. 
The endogeneity problem is resolved by specifying and estimating simultaneous 
systems of equations, not by relying on lagged variables and the GMM estimation 
technique in a single equation. Recall the brief review of various growth theories in 
Section 2; the impact of inequality on growth is mainly channeled through its effects on 
physical and human capital formations.44 Thus, it is necessary to include investment and 
education equations in the system. Consequently, we end up with a four-equation 
system after adding the usual growth and inequality equations. In contrast, Barro (2000) 
and Lundberg and Squire (2003) did not endogenize the human capital variable in their 
models. It is noted that estimating the inequality equation permits testing of the 
controversial Kuznets hypothesis. 
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Using INEPIL to denote the inequality terms associated with PIL (INEPIL = RHS of (4) 
excluding  b),  incm to denote the income level lagged by 1 year, the systems of 
equations are specified as (detailed definitions of variables are provided in the 
appendix) 
Incmgr = f1(popgr, invt, edu, gov, cpi, trade, urbangr, private, incm, incmsq, central, 
west) 
Invt = f2(INEPIL, gov, cpi, trade, urban, private, incm, incmsq, central, west)  
Edu = f3(INEPIL, peduexp, urban, incm, incmsq, central, west)  
Inequality = f4(incmgr, trade, agrexp, urban, private, incm, incmsq, central, west) 
The first equation in the system explains per capita income growth (incmgr), which is 
determined by population growth (popgr) as a proxy of labor input, investment 
expressed as proportion of GDP (invt), and human capital defined as average years of 
schooling (edu). These are standard growth determinants. Following Barro (2000) and 
Clarke (1995), we add government expenditure as a ratio of GDP (gov) and inflation 
(cpi) to this equation. The former represents government interference in economic 
activities and the latter may capture macroeconomic conditions or business cycle 
effects. Also controlled are openness (trade), urbanization (urbangr), and privatization 
(private) variables. Following Phillips and Chen (2004), we include lagged income level 
(incm) and its square in the growth regression. The square term is added to capture any 
nonlinearity in convergence. Location dummy variables for central and western 
provinces are used in this and all other equations to contain heterogeneity. 
In specifying the investment function, the most relevant variable, besides inequality 
(INE), is lagged per capita income (incm) as a proxy of savings plus its square (incmsq). 
As with the growth equation, government interference (gov) and macroeconomic 
conditions (cpi) are important independent variables. Little is necessary to justify the 
inclusions of openness, urbanization, and privatization in the investment model. 
Although various growth theories indicate that inequality matters for human capital 
formation, few earlier attempts were made to specify the education equation. It is well 
known that income (incm) is a determinant of education as schooling is costly in China. 
The income–education relationship may be nonlinear, so we include a square term of 
income (incmsq) in the model. Also, education is likely to be affected by government 
spending on education, culture, and health (peduexp). Needless to say, more urbanized 
regions enjoy better education; thus the urbanization variable (urban) is relevant. 
Leaving income growth and location dummy variables aside, five other variables are 
included in the inequality model. The Kuznets hypothesis dictates that the income 
variable and its square ought to be considered. Privatization is included as it is 
commonly perceived to be a cause of inequality in China. On the other hand, openness 
and urbanization are included as Wan et al. (2005) and Lu and Chen (forthcoming), 
respectively, find that they contribute to regional inequality. Given that the inequality 
variable is defined as the urban–rural income ratio, government support to agriculture 
(agrexp) is expected to help narrow the urban–rural income gap.   7
3  Empirical evidence from China 
China represents a very interesting case for studying the inequality–growth relationship. 
Except the urban–rural disparity, prereform China was basically an egalitarian society. 
The low inequality was identified as a strain on economic growth. This is why Deng 
Xiaoping, at the onset of economic reforms, famously stated that “let some get rich 
first.” The reform period has seen remarkable growth. Although regional inequality and 
the rural–urban gap declined from the late 1970s to the mid-1980s, both increased rather 
dramatically since the mid-1980s. China’s growth is preceded by a fairly low initial 
inequality in the prereform period. From this perspective, the inequality–growth 
relationship seems to be negative. However, the Chinese experience depicts a positive 
correlation when pre- and postreform periods are examined separately. 
There is more. In the early 2004, the Primer of China announced a growth target of 7 
percent, which is lower than any of the growth rates in China since economic reform 
began in 1978 (excluding the unusual period from 1989 to 1990). Such a move is 
unprecedented and represents a major policy shift to address, at least partly, the 
inequality problem in China. The high and rising inequality is perceived to hurt the 
national economy from the perspectives of slacking domestic demand and political 
instability. Directing resources to the rural sector and noncoastal regions is expected to 
slow down growth in the short run, but may help achieve sustainable growth in the long 
run. Clearly, policy makers in China, past and present, see both (short-run) positive and 
(long-run) negative effects of inequality on growth. 
These observations appeal for a proper analytical study. Toward this end, data at the 
regional or provincial level for 1987–2001 are used to estimate the systems of equations 
outlined in Section 2. Though desirable, earlier data are too incomplete to be useful. 
Excluding Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao, China has 31 provinces or regions, 
including four autonomous municipal cities. Hainan province was created in 1988 and is 
merged with Guangdong. Chongqing is the youngest region in China. Fortunately, data 
for Chongqing are available. Most data for Xizang (Tibet) are missing. Therefore, our 
sample consists of 29 regions. All observations in value terms are deflated by rural and 
urban CPIs, respectively. For details on data sources and data construction, see the 
appendix. 
The systems of equations are estimated with three-stage least squares after setting m=9. 
To determine the degree of polynomial n, the general-to-specific approach is followed. 
This approach is also recommended by Mitchell and Speaker (1986). We started with 
n=6, in which case high collinearity leads to automatic drops of some PIL terms by 
STATA. When n is reduced to 5, the PIL term in the investment equation is 
insignificant. Once this term is removed, all PIL terms are significant at the 10 percent 
level. The estimation results are reported in Table 1. 
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Table 1 Estimation results 
Right-hand side   Growth Equation    Investment Equation    Education Equation    Inequality Equation   
variables Coefficient  T-ratio    Coefficient T-ratio    Coefficient  T-ratio   Coefficient  T-ratio   
PIL (n = 2)           −0.285  −1.707 
* 0.137  1.930 
*      
  
PIL (n = 3)       1.563  2.312 
**  −1.071  −1.818 
*      
PIL (n = 4)       −1.351  −2.598 
*** 2.287  1.716 
*      
PIL (n = 5)            −1.351  −1.652 
*      
peduexp            0.0006  0.300         
agrexp                  −0.041  3.727 
*** 
incmgr                  −0.043  3.071 
*** 
popgr  −0.068  −1.015                   
invt  1.58 7.215 
***                 
edu  3.561 3.028 
***                 
gov  −1.529  −6.141 
*** 1.16  7.733 
***            
cpi  −0.442  −4.604 
*** 0.262  3.011 
***            
urbangr  0.375 5.282 
***                 
urban      −0.073  −1.352   0.042  8.400 
***  −0.013  4.333 
*** 
trade  0.064 2.667 
***  −0.025  −1.136         0.007  7.000 
*** 
private  0.805 6.765 
***  −0.416  −5.012 
***       −0.02  3.333 
*** 
incm  −53.468  −1.308   6.629  0.161   7.399  1.735 
*  −12.322  4.444 
*** 
incmsq  0.698  0.234   1.058  0.352   −0.476  −2.817   0.874  4.348 
*** 
central  7.956 3.716 
***  −5.48  −3.914 
*** 0.282  2.541 
** 0.272  2.989 
*** 
west  −5.557  −2.621 
*** 4.833  2.271 
**  −0.403  −2.385 
** 0.76  6.129 
*** 
constant  292.929 2.003 
**  −76.008  −0.524 
   −22.97  −1.581 




*Significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.   9
The estimated models are of good quality with most parameters significantly different 
from zero. Notwithstanding that little can be said a priori about the signs of many 
estimates, the positive and significant impacts of physical and human capital 
investments, trade, urbanization, and privatization on growth are consistent with 
economic theory. Government expenditure is found to be detrimental to growth (when 
investment is held constant) but helpful in increasing investment. These are acceptable 
since this variable is included as a proxy for government intervention, particularly in 
bank lending. See Clarke (1995) and Partridge (1997). As far as the education equation 
is concerned, higher income is found to cause more human capital formation and 
urbanization is positively related to regional education level; both findings corroborate 
well with normal expectations. 
One interesting finding relates to the income terms in the growth equation. It shows that 
growth does not depend on income levels in China, at any conventional level of 
statistical significance. This is different from Barro (2000), who shows that the growth–
inequality relationship is conditional on the level of development; it is positive across 
developed economies and negative in the developing world. It is noted, however, that 
inequality does not enter the growth equation directly in our model. Another income-
related finding is that the Kuznets hypothesis is rejected. In contrast, a U-pattern is 
supported by the Chinese data, which is in line with Wan (2004). 
Some comments on the inequality equation are in order. As indicated by the coefficients 
of the location dummy variables, the urban–rural divide is more severe in western than 
in central regions, which in turn is more severe than in coastal regions. This is 
understandable as urban China is more equal across locations, while development in 
rural China is heavily reliant on geographic conditions. When everything else is the 
same, the rural west usually lags behind with the east leading. Also, Table 1 indicates 
that in addition to the variables of government support to agriculture and income 
growth, privatization helps reduce the rural–urban income gap. This is justified because 
TVEs in China, a major component of the privatization index, represent an important 
driving force in narrowing down the rural–urban gap, although they may contribute to 
the growing inequality among rural regions (Wan and Zhu, 2006). Consistent with Wan 
et al. (2005), trade is an inequality-increasing variable. 
Now, attention is turned to the crucial question: how does inequality affect growth? 
Since the impact is channeled through investment and education, we first examine the 
relationship between inequality and these two factors. Referring to equation (1), the 
marginal effects of inequality are given by wi. These are shown in Figure 1(a). In 
particular, the instant impact is given by w0, which is negative in the investment 
equation but positive in the education model. The impact of inequality on investment 
turns to be positive after 1 year and remains so for a number of years. It reverts to be 
negative after 4 years and reaches the negative peak in year 6, before eventually 
converging to zero. On the other hand, inequality seems more beneficial to human 
capital formation over all time horizons except in years 3 and 4. The positive effect 
reaches a peak in year 7 and then converges to zero. 
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Figure 2. Inequality–growth nexus: instant and lagged effects (dashed line), and cumulative 
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It is also useful to sum wi to obtain the cumulative effects over different time horizons. 
These are plotted in Figure 1(b), which demonstrates that inequality is detrimental to 
investment no matter what time interval is considered. This is consistent with Alesina 
and Rodrik (1994), who demonstrate that high inequality may lead to political 
instability, which is detrimental to investment and growth. Conversely, this finding 
corroborates well with the fact that investment rate is low in inland regions where the 
rural–urban gap is large. In contrast, investment rate is high in coastal areas where the 
rural–urban gap is relatively smaller. Figure 1(b) also indicates that inequality helps 
promote accumulation of human capital, which may imply the validity of Simpson’s 
(1990) inverted-U pattern between education and inequality in China. As is known, 
educational level in China has been on the rise and such a rise is accompanied by the 
increasing inequality. It is useful to point out that the education–inequality relationship 
is largely an empirical one as alternative theories exist, which predict opposite effects of 
inequality on education. Our modeling results support the proposition of Perotti (1992), 
who concludes that rising inequality enables the rich to obtain education first when 
tuition fee is high relative to income. Mayer (2000) confirms the positive impact of 
inequality on college education in the United States. It has been widely publicized that 
education is exceedingly expensive in China, particularly for secondary and 
postsecondary studies. From this perspective, the positive impact of inequality on 
education is understandable. 
Once the impacts of inequality on education and investment are identified, it is 
straightforward to simulate the inequality–growth relationship by allowing inequality to 
increase at a certain margin or percentage. Figure 2 shows the instant or lagged as well 
as cumulative impacts on growth when China’s urban–rural income ratio is raised by 
0.1 unit. The instant and lagged effects fast decrease to zero after an initially negative 
and then positive influences in the first four years. The cumulative line demonstrates a   12
negative relationship between inequality and growth, and this relationship holds no 
matter what time horizon is considered. Most interestingly, the relationship is found to 
be nonlinear, a key point underlying the theory proposed by Banerjee and Duflo (2003). 
4 Summary 
In this paper, we introduce the polynomial inverse lag (PIL) model in order to 
accommodate, within one unified framework, potentially differing impacts of inequality 
on growth over different time horizons. Applying simultaneous equations incorporating 
the PIL to data from one country, namely China, our results are expected to suffer less 
from the problems of heterogeneity, endogeneity, and measurement errors, commonly 
encountered in cross-country growth regressions. 
Despite the seemingly positive correlation between growth and inequality in postreform 
China, our empirical results unequivocally point to the negative effects of inequality on 
growths in the short, medium, and long runs. The negative effects stem from the strong 
and negative influence of inequality on physical investment, which consistently 
overweigh the mostly positive impacts of inequality on human capital. The inequality–
growth relationship is found to be nonlinear, so are the inequality–investment and 
inequality–education relationships. 
As with any other study, this paper can be improved along many dimensions such as 
data quality, model refinements, and better estimation techniques. One particular avenue 
for future research lies in the development of bootstrapping or other tools in order to 
attach statistical significance to the identified effects of inequality on growth. Another 
issue that is yet to be dealt with is to conduct a robustness test of our research findings. 
This could be difficult given the open-ended nature of growth theories (Brock and 
Durlauf, 2001). 
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Appendix: Data 
(1)  Unless indicated otherwise, data for the period 1987–1998 are all from 
Comprehensive Statistical Data and Materials for 50 Years of New China (NBS, 
1999). Data for years 1999–2001, unless indicated otherwise, are from China 
Statistical Yearbook, 2000, 2001 and 2002 (NBS, various years). 
(2)  popgr = population growth rate. Except for Hebei, Heilongjiang, and Gansu, 
1999–2001 data of agricultural and nonagricultural population are from provincial 
statistical yearbooks. Population data of Hebei, Heilongjiang, and Gansu in 2000 
are from China Statistical Yearbook, 2001. For these three regions, the 1999 
population data are the averages of the neighboring two years, and the 2001 data 
are forecast based on data in 2000 and the growth rate during 1999–2000. 
(3)  incm = per capita income lagged by 1 year. Regional income is the weighted 
average of urban and rural per capita incomes, with nonagricultural and 
agricultural population shares as weights. Both urban and rural incomes are 
deflated by regional urban and rural CPIs. For Shanghai, Beijing, and Tianjin, 
urban and rural CPIs are the same. 
(4)  Incmsq = incm squared.  
(5)  urgap = urban–rural income gap. It is defined as urban–rural per capita income 
ratio. 
(6)  incmgr = income growth rate. It is calculated on the basis of Incm. 
(7)  invmtgdp = investment/GDP ratio. It is computed as total fixed capital investment 
over GDP.  
(8)  edu = education. China Population Yearbooks report regional population by 
education attainment as from 1987. Unfortunately, such data were not published 
for 1989, 1991, and 1992, and data for 1987 and 1988 are incomplete as illiterate 
population are not reported. Also, unlike data for other years, the 1994 data did 
not consider population below the age of 15. To estimate data for these years, we 
compute average years of schooling using data for the other years and then fit the 
model: 
μ + ⋅ = ) ( ) ln( f edu , 
 whereeduis per capita years of schooling, f(·) is simply a linear function of time 
trend and regional dummies, and μ is the error term. This model is estimated by 
the GLS technique, allowing for heteroskedasticity in the panel data. The R
2 of 
the estimated equation is 0.966. Denoting the predicted value by ^, we have 
] ) ln( exp[
^ ^ edu edu = exp(0.5
2 ˆ σ ), 
 where 
^ ) ln(edu denotes the predicted values of ln(edu) and
2 ˆ σ is the estimated 
variance of μ. Data for 1987–1989, 1991, 1992, and 1994 are estimated by the 
above model. 
(9)  gov = governmental consumption ratio, exclusive of expenditure on culture, 
education, science, and health care. Unlike in the existing literature we cannot 
exclude education and defense expenditures as these substatistics are not available 
at the regional/provincial level. 
(10)  trade is computed as the trade/GDP ratio. Trade data are converted into RMB. 
(11)  cpi are used to proxy inflation. CPIs of Qinghai are from provincial statistical 
yearbook.   16
(12)  agrexp = proportion of provincial fiscal expenditure on agriculture. 
(13)  peduexp = per capita government expenditure on culture, education, science, and 
health care. 
(14)  private = privatization, computed as the proportion of workers and staff in 
nonstate-owned entities. 
(15)  urban = urbanization, defined as the proportion of nonagricultural population in 
the total. 
(16)  urbangr = growth rate of urban. 
(17)  center, west: location dummies for central and western China, respectively. 
Consistent with most of the literature, central provinces refer to Shanxi, Inner 
Mongolia, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, and 
Guangxi, and western provinces include Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Shaanxi, 
Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Chongqing and Xinjiang. 
 